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Abstract
The “annuity puzzle” refers to the fact that annuities are rarely purchased despite the
longevity insurance they provide. Most explanations for this puzzle assume that indi-
viduals have accurate expectations about their future survival. We provide evidence
that individuals misperceive their mortality risk, and study the demand for annuities
in a setting where annuities are priced by insurers on the basis of objectively-measured
survival probabilities but in which individuals make purchasing decisions based on
their own subjective survival probabilities. Subjective expectations have the capacity
to explain significant rates of non-annuitization, yielding a quantitatively important
explanation for the annuity puzzle.
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1 Introduction
Annuities insure individuals against longevity risk by allowing them to exchange wealth for
an income stream guaranteed until death. Theory predicts that under general conditions,
risk-averse individuals will purchase a fairly-priced annuity (Yaari (1965); Davidoff et al.
(2005)). Few households, however, ever purchase an annuity.1 This divergence between
theory and experience has become known as the “annuity puzzle”.
Most of the explanations that have been proposed for this puzzle2 attempt to rationalize
non-purchase by individuals who are assumed to have accurate perceptions of their survival
probabilities. Individuals are not, however, well-informed about their survival probabilities
(Hurd and McGarry (1995), Elder (2013), Wu et al. (2015)).
We study the demand for annuities in a setting where those annuities are priced by
insurers on the basis of objectively-assessed survival probabilities but in which individuals
make purchasing decisions on the basis of their own subjective survival probabilities. We
estimate subjective survival curves for a sample of older individuals using directly-measured
expectations. Consistent with an established literature (see, for example, Hurd and McGarry
(1995); Elder (2013), Wu et al. (2015)), our study finds that, on average, individuals under -
estimate their probability of survival through their 50s, 60s and 70s and over -estimate their
chances of survival through their late 80s and beyond. Overall, pessimism dominates, and
most respondents would perceive an annuity that is priced fairly from an actuarial point of
view as one which is unfairly-priced.
As with all insurance products, individuals might, depending on their preferences, still
purchase an annuity that is unfairly-priced as the longevity insurance provided by the annuity
1Lockwood (2012) reports that less than 5% of a sample of single retirees in the US own an annuity;
Inkmann et al. (2011) show that only 6% of older households in the UK voluntarily purchase an annuity.
2These explanations including adverse selection (Brugiavini (1993); Finkelstein and Poterba (2004);
Finkelstein and Poterba (2014)), bequest motives (Lockwood (2012); Gan et al. (2015)), precautionary saving
for medical and long-term care expenses, (Reichling and Smetters (2015), Ameriks et al. (2011)), existing
annuity provision from social security income (Pashchenko (2013)), cognitive limitations on individuals’
abilities to value annuities (Brown et al. (2017)) and costs of administration (Mitchell et al. (1999)). See
Brown (2007) for a general review of this literature.
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might be worth the low apparent (to them) ‘money’s worth’. Whether survival pessimism is
an important driver of the demand for annuities by risk averse individuals is an open question.
To assess the quantitative importance of survival pessimism for annuity purchases, we embed
these subjective survival curves in a lifecycle model of consumption, saving and annuitization.
We estimate the proportion of their wealth that individuals would choose to annuitize, given
their idiosyncratic subjective survival curves. Parameterizing our model with plausible levels
of risk aversion and patience, we are able to explain high rates of non-annuitization. In the
setting of Yaari (1965), patient individuals with ‘objective’ expectations about their own
survival will choose to annuitize their entire stock of wealth when offered an actuarially
fair annuity. We find that, when behaving according to their ‘subjective’ expectations, the
average rate of annuitization for such individuals would be between 42% and 64%, for a
plausible range of levels of risk aversion. To benchmark the quantitative importance of
this channel, we compare these results to those we obtain by introducing into our model
actuarially unfair pricing caused by adverse selection (or transaction costs or other market
imperfections), a leading rationalization of low annuity demand. In this case, the average
share of wealth annuitized would range from 34% to 69% for the same range of levels of risk
aversion. We therefore find that survival pessimism is quantitatively as important as the
higher prices caused by adverse selection.
This result does not depend on other explanations that have been given for non-annuitization;
in our model, individuals have only modest social security income, do not have bequest mo-
tives, face no medical cost risk, do not have access to means-tested income floors and annuities
are priced fairly given objectively-measured survival rates. The difference between ‘objective’
and individual-specific ‘subjective’ survival curves is large enough, for many individuals, to
outweigh the insurance value of annuitizing much of their retirement wealth.
Subjective expectations of survival have been shown to be empirically important in ex-
plaining a number of economic decisions. Hurd et al. (2004) find that those with particularly
low expectations of survival are more likely to retire earlier and to claim Social Security
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benefits earlier; de Bresser (2020) studies a similar phenomenon and shows that bringing
individual-level variation in survival probabilities into a lifecycle model can help explain the
timing of retirement and benefit claiming. Bloom et al. (2006) find that a higher subjective
probability of survival is associated with higher wealth levels. Gan et al. (2015) finds that a
model of wealth decumulation and bequests including subjective survival expectations better
fits decumulation and bequest behavior than does one with life table survival probabilities.
Heimer et al. (2019) solve a life-cycle model with subjective mortality beliefs and show that
‘pessimism’ about survival to older age, combined with ‘optimism’ at the oldest ages can
explain both under-saving for retirement and slow decumulation of wealth at the end of life.
None of these papers considers an annuitization choice, as we do.
There is evidence of a correlation between individual longevity – realized as well as
expected – and decisions around annuitization. Examining the voluntary market for annuities
in the United Kingdom, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) find a positive association between
ex-post survival and features of annuities purchased (for example those who buy back-loaded
annuities are longer-lived). Teppa and Lafourcade (2013) find that stated optimism around
survival is positively correlated with stated demand for annuities while Inkmann et al. (2011)
find a similar link between subjective expectations and annuity purchases.3 That paper also
experiments with subjective survival probabilities in a life cycle model and shows that if
subjective survival probabilities are reduced by 10% at each age (a quantity that is not
empirically grounded), no households would demand an annuity. Wu et al. (2015) embed
estimated subjective survival curves within a lifecycle model of consumption and savings.
While they make calculations of the perceived ‘money’s worth’ of annuities (finding that
annuities are perceived to offer less than actuarially fair value, on average), their model does
not contain an annuitization choice. The contribution of our paper is to study the importance
of the observed divergence between reported survival expectations and objective survival
rates – the ‘survival pessimism’ discussed above – for the annuitization decision. Given
3However, Brown (2001) finds no evidence of this phenomenon.
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that sufficiently risk averse agents may choose to buy unfairly priced insurance products in
preference to remaining uninsured, we do this by combining subjective expectations data
with an economic model of consumption, savings and annuitization.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 outlines the data. Section 3 compares average reported
survival expectations to official life tables, and sets out our method for constructing ‘subjec-
tive’ survival curves from stated beliefs. In Section 4 we outline the model of annuitization
and the impact of introducing subjective survival curves on predicted rates of annuitization.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
We draw on data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) (Marmot et al.
(2017)), a biennial panel representative of the English household population aged 50 and
above. ELSA is part of a network of longitudinal aging studies around the world, modeled
on the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS). One module of the survey asks individuals
about their expectations that certain events will happen in future, including whether or not
they will leave an inheritance, whether they will still be in work at a certain age and whether
at some point in the future they will not have enough resources to meet their financial needs.
This battery of questions opens with the following statement:
“Now I have some questions about how likely you think various events might be. When I
ask a question I’d like you to give me a number from 0 to 100, where 0 means that you think
there is absolutely no chance an event will happen, and 100 means that you think the event
is absolutely certain to happen.”
As part of this module, individuals are asked a question of the form “What are the chances
that you will live to be age X or more?”, where the age X depends on the current age of the
respondent. All individuals aged 65 and under are asked about survival to age 75. Those
aged 66 or older are asked about the age which is between 11 and 15 years ahead of their
4
current age and is a multiple of 5. For example, those aged 75-79 are asked about survival
to age 90. Additionally, from wave 3 onwards, all individuals aged under 70 were asked a
second question about survival to age 85. We denote individual i’s reported probability of
survival to age α as Ri(α).
Over the first seven waves of ELSA, 16,345 unique individuals are asked one or more
survival questions in 67,201 separate interviews. In all of our analysis, unless otherwise
stated, we weight observations by the cross-sectional weights available in the ELSA data.
2.1 Evaluating the content of subjective reports
Before using individual responses to survival probability questions in analysis, we wish to
assess whether individuals appear to understand the meaning of these questions and to be
able to engage with the probabilistic concepts involved. Next, assuming that participants
understand these questions, we would like to establish, as far as possible, whether answers
constitute considered, reflective judgements that might plausibly guide behavior, or are in-
stead picked with little prior thought.
In just 1.5% of interviews, individuals answer “Don’t know” to one or more survival
probability questions, suggesting a willingness to answer in almost all cases. Figure 1 shows
the distribution of reported survival probabilities for the full sample of first questions asked,
in bins of 10 percentage points. We split the sample into those aged below 65 and those aged
65 and above, with the younger group much more likely to report high chances of survival.
Some individuals answer “0%” or “100%” to the survival questions (5.3% and 6.8%
respectively). Both of these answers might be evidence of a lack of understanding of the
question. However neither is conclusively so; respondents are asked to report probabilities on
a discrete scale, and so rounding, combined with a terminal diagnosis or extreme optimism,
respectively, could rationalize these answers. We include these individuals in the sample,
but show in Appendix B.3 that our results change very little if we exclude either or both of
these groups.
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Source: ELSA waves 1–7. 66,210 answers from 16,345 unique individuals
When individuals are asked two survival questions, they can report a higher chance of
survival to the older age than to the younger age. This happens in 8.3% of interviews.
Given that such responses indicate a fundamental misunderstanding of the question, we
remove these individuals from all of the remaining analysis.
One may have reservations about the fact that a high proportion - 20.5% - of answers
are “50%”. There could be a concern that individuals pick this focal answer when wanting
to give a response but not understanding the question. We assess this by examining these
individuals’ answers to other probability questions. Those individuals who answer “50%”
almost always give a range of answers to other questions and are no more likely to answer
“50%” to other probability questions than are the rest of the sample (Appendix A.1 gives
further details). Of the 16,345 individuals who answered one or more survival questions,
only 41 individuals (0.2%) answered “50%” to all survival questions in all waves. On the
basis of this evidence, we retain answers of “50%” in our main sample but show in Appendix
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B.3 the (minimal) sensitivity of results to their removal.
Given that the overwhelming majority of individuals give answers that do not indicate a
lack of understanding of probabilities, we perform four further tests aimed at assessing the
informational content of responses and whether they relate to economic behaviour. Firstly,
we find that responses are correlated with known mortality risk factors (e.g. smoking, drink-
ing and health conditions) in a way that is consistent with existing evidence. For example,
current smokers report a 6-8 percentage points lower probability of survival over the 11-15
year horizon, relative to current non-smokers.4 Secondly, using the panel nature of the sur-
vey we find that reports ‘update’ over time in response to news relevant to mortality such
as diagnoses of new health conditions. For example, a new cancer diagnosis was associated
with a 4 percentage point reduction in the stated probability of surviving to an age 11 to
15 years ahead.5 Thirdly, exploiting a link to administrative death records from the En-
glish National Health Service, we find that reported expectations are correlated with actual
subsequent mortality over a 10 year horizon.6 While it is possible that individuals’ answers
to survival expectations questions could represent their ‘actual’ expectations even if there
was no association with the above outcomes, these findings provide additional evidence that
answers represent meaningful, reflective judgements.7 Fourth, in line with expectations be-
ing drivers of economic behavior, we find that stated survival expectations are negatively
correlated with purchases of life insurance, a product analogous to selling an annuity.8
4This result is obtained using linear regression of reported probability on smoker status, controlling for
a range of other risk factors, demographic variables, health conditions and self-reported health. Full details
are given in in Appendix A.2.
5This result is from a linear fixed effects regression of reported survival probability on a range of variables
for whether individuals have been diagnosed with particular health conditions, as well as other risk factors
and demographic variables. Full details are given in in Appendix A.2.
6Full details are given in Appendix A.2.
7Hurd and McGarry (2002) make a similar point with respect to subjective expectations in the Health
and Retirement Survey.
8This result is from a linear regression in which the outcome is the percentage of individuals’ total wealth
portfolio held as life insurance. Stated expectations are negatively correlated with this outcome. Full details
are given in Appendix A.2. A lifecycle model with some positive weight placed on heirs will predict a ceteris
paribus negative relationship between subjective expectations of own survival and life insurance demand.
Quantifying the full implications of survival pessimism for the level of this demand depends on the form
and strength of the motive for leaving bequests. The implications of survival pessimism for life insurance
demand is an interesting avenue for future research.
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3 Assessing the accuracy of subjective expectations of
survival
In this section, we describe the patterns in subjective reports, compare them to actual
mortality rates and projections and derive idiosyncratic survival curves that will be used,
together with our model, to evaluate the importance of these curves for the annuitization
decision. The results that we find – that individuals are mostly pessimistic about survival
to younger ages and optimistic regarding survival to older ages – are consistent with a
well-established literature analyzing the accuracy of self-reported survival probabilities and
self-reported life expectancy across a number of countries and in a variety of survey settings.
We give a brief review of this literature before proceeding.
In the first studies comparing subjective expectations to an objective benchmark, Hurd
and McGarry (1995) and Hurd and McGarry (2002) analysed the survival expectations data
available in the first wave and first two waves, respectively, of the HRS and compared it
to the period life tables available at that time. These studies concluded that while there
was some evidence that men underestimated their chances of survival to age 75 relative
to life tables (with women approximately accurate) and that women overestimated their
chances of survival to age 85 relative to life tables (with men approximately accurate),
mean expectations were broadly consistent with the period life tables. However, subsequent
research using the HRS drew upon more expectations data and, due to the passage of time,
was able to compare stated expectations to subsequent survival of the sample. Elder (2013)
compared reported survival probabilities from the first waves of data in the HRS and AHEAD
surveys to the respondents’ actual subsequent survival to the age they were asked about.
Doing so revealed a substantial (over 10 percentage points) underestimation of survival
probabilities, on average, for those in their early 60s (who were asked about survival to age
75), a mild underestimation by those in their early 70s (who were asked about survival to age
85) and growing optimism about survival for those aged over 75 (who are asked about ages
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between 11 and 15 years ahead of their current age). Ludwig and Zimper (2013) found the
same patterns in waves 5 to 7 of the HRS, when using Human Mortality Database and Social
Security Administration (SSA) life tables. Grevenbrock et al. (2020) confirm these patterns
in waves 8 to 12 of the HRS, comparing subjective reports to estimated objective survival
probabilities. Heimer et al. (2019) use the 2014 wave of the HRS, the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) and a survey of their own to document further evidence that US seniors
underestimate their near-term survival up until the age of around 70 (by between 15 and 20
percentage points), after which they become gradually more optimistic about survival.
The pattern of substantial pessimism about survival through the 50s and 60s and early
70s, turning to relative optimism about survival to the oldest ages, that is found in US
surveys is also present in a variety of surveys across a range of other countries. These
include the Netherlands (Teppa and Lafourcade, 2013), Australia (Wu et al., 2015) and
Germany (Bucher-Koenen and Kluth (2013)). Hurd et al. (2005) document similar patterns
across a number of European countries using the Survey for Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe. Boyer et al. (2020), asking only about survival expectations to 85, find evidence
of optimism about survival to that age in a survey of Canadians aged 55 to 75.
3.1 Comparing reports to actual mortality data
The UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) life tables contain actual and projected mortality
data for the England and Wales population by sex and year-of-birth. These tables would
be a natural benchmark against which to assess subjective expectations if the ELSA sample
were representative of the whole English population.9 As ELSA is representative only of
the non-institutionalized population (meaning those in residential care, for example, are
excluded), mortality rates for the ELSA population are slightly lower than given by the
9While ELSA includes only English residents, ONS cohort life tables are only available for England and
Wales combined and not England-only, for the cohorts we analyse. However, this will make little difference
to our analysis as Wales makes up around 6% of the England and Wales population and has very similar
mortality patterns.
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ONS life tables.10 We use administrative death records linked to ELSA to “rescale” the
data in the ONS life tables by the observed difference in average mortality rates between the
ELSA sample and those implied by the ONS life tables. In Appendix B.1 we show that our
main results are somewhat attenuated, but qualitatively unchanged, if we use the ONS life
tables without rescaling them.
ELSA is linked to administrative death records such that we know if any individual
(including attriters) has died up until February 2013. We use this information to “rescale”
the official life tables in the following way. We calculate, for each year of age, the actual
morality hazard rate observed in the ELSA sample and the expected mortality hazard rate if
each individual faced the hazard rate implied by the ONS life table for their sex and year-of-
birth. For each sex, we fit a cubic in age to actual hazard rates using OLS and calculate the
ratio of the fitted hazard rate to the ONS hazard rate at each age. We take the mean ratio
across ages and use this to rescale the hazard rates underlying the ONS survival curves for
each sex and year-of-birth, yielding a set of “scaled” ONS survival curves. Our method yields
hazard rates for men and women that are 71% and 69% of their original level, respectively
– that is, those in the ELSA sample have lower mortality probabilities (and therefore higher
life expectancies) than the population at large. Figure 2 shows a comparison of the original
ONS survival curve with the “scaled” survival curve for 60-year old men and women, born
in 1950. We see that, for example, men are estimated to have a 50% chance of survival to
age 90, in comparison to the 38% figure in the ONS life table. The corresponding figures for
women are 60% and 48% respectively.
We use the “scaled” ONS survival curves life tables as an “objective” benchmark to assess
whether particular age-sex-cohort groups have positively biased (‘optimistic’) or negatively
biased (‘pessimistic’) expectations of survival to various “target ages” (i.e. the age about
which the individual is asked the question). We conduct this analysis at the most granular
10The ELSA data in linked to administrative death records giving the date of death for any ELSA
respondent who died on or before February 2013. Amongst those aged 50 to 70 in ELSA wave 1, the actual
mortality rate over the period until February 2013 (approximately a 10-year period) was 10.5%. The average
ONS life table implied death rate over that period for the same sample was 13.0%.
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Figure 2: Comparison of ONS cohort survival curve and “scaled” survival curve for men























































































Source: ELSA waves 1–7 and ONS 2014-based cohort life tables for England and Wales.
level for which these comparisons are possible: we calculate for each combination of age
in years, year of birth, sex, and target age, the average reported survival probability, and
compare this to the relevant scaled life table probability. A clear pattern emerges. Individuals
are, on average, ‘pessimistic’ about their chances of survival to ages 75, 80, 85 and 90 and then
become increasingly optimistic as they get older and are asked about survival to older ages.
While the degrees of ‘optimism’ and ‘pessimism’ vary slightly between cohorts, these patterns
are consistently found across those born in the 1920s through to the 1950s. Comparing men
and women, we see that women tend to be slightly more pessimistic on average, than men.
Figure 3 illustrates the comparison between mean subjective survival probabilities and
scaled life tables for men and women born in the 1930s. We see that individuals in their
early 60s under-estimate survival to age 75 by around 25 to 30 percentage points while those
in their late 60s and early 70s under-estimate survival to age 85 by 15 to 20 percentage
points. Turning to those in their late 80s, we see that they are close to accurate about their
probability of survival, on average.11
11Note that in Figure 3, each “subjective” data point corresponds to an average over respondents with
different birth years. The “objective” data points are constructed by weighting the corresponding scaled life
table survival probabilities according to the proportions of individuals with each birth year in the sample.
11
Figure 3: Comparison of mean ‘subjective’ reports and scaled ONS cohort survival



















































































Note: Different colored series correspond to different ages about which respondents are asked
questions. Source: ELSA waves 1–7 and ONS 2014-based cohort life tables for England and Wales.
These findings are in line with those in existing literature, including Elder (2013) and
Heimer et al. (2019), which establish in a number of settings the pattern of over-estimation of
mortality hazard rates at ages until around the mid-80s, with under-estimation of mortality
rates at older ages.
3.2 Constructing subjective survival curves
In this section, we describe how we use stated survival expectations to estimate the individual-
specific subjective survival curves that will be used in our lifecycle model. There are an
infinite number of possible survival curves consistent with the answers that individuals give
to the survival questions. We are therefore required to make further assumptions if we are
to infer individuals’ subjective survival curves from their reports about their survival to spe-
cific ages. We make an assumption on the functional form of individuals subjective survival
curves. Specifically, we assume that subjective survival probabilities follow a Weibull dis-
tribution. The Weibull distribution is widely used in the epidemiological literature and for
12
modeling aging processes generally.12
The Weibull distribution is a two-parameter (λi, ki) distribution defined in the following








: λi, ki > 0 (1)
We estimate subjective survival curves for all individuals in our sample who answered
two survival questions (i.e. all those aged under 70 who answered two questions and were
not removed from the sample due to giving “impossible” answers). We make one additional
weak assumption – that individuals believe that they are almost certain not to live beyond
age 110 – by including the relevant scaled life table survival probability for each individual
for target age 110 as a third “report” (we denote this third subjective “report” by Ri(110)).
We fit the individual’s Weibull-distributed subjective survival curve by estimating λi and ki
using these three reports and non-linear least squares. That is, denoting the set of 3 ages for
which we have subjective reports by Ai we choose the parameter vector (λ̂i, k̂i) that satisfies













Figure 4 illustrates the curve-fitting procedure applied to the median responses from men
and women born in the 1940s and compares these subjective survival curves to the relevant
scaled life table survival curves. The subjective curve implies that at age 60, this group of
individuals are pessimistic about survival to all ages up until around age 100 and optimistic
about survival to ages beyond this. The subjective life expectancy measures implied by
these curves are 8.6 and 9.6 years lower than the life expectancies calculated using life table
survival curves for men and women, respectively. This is equivalent to life expectancies at
the age of 60 that are 31% (for men) and 33% (for women) lower than those implied by life
12See Bissonnette et al. (2017) for an example of use of the Weibull distribution to construct objective
and subjective survival curves using data from the HRS. The authors report that their results are similar
when using the Weibull or the (also widely-used) Gomertz distribution.
13
Figure 4: Comparison of median ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ survival curves for men (LHS)
























































































Source: ELSA waves 1–7 and ONS 2014-based cohort life tables for England and Wales.
tables, on average.
Average overall pessimism of this magnitude is found across sexes and cohorts when
interviewed in their 50s and 60s. Using the full sample of individuals for whom we have a
subjective survival curve, we can compare ‘subjective’ and scaled life table life expectancy at
the individual level. Subjective life expectancy is lower than scaled life table life expectancy
by 6.1 years, or 22%, amongst men, and 7.7 years, or 25%, amongst women, on average.
4 Subjective survival expectations and annuitization
Annuities provide insurance against longevity risk. The decision about how much of one’s
wealth to annuitize at a given price ought to depend on the individual’s assessment of this
longevity risk. Individuals who under-estimate their longevity may perceive an annuity as a
worse deal than it truly is. This is a potential explanation for the unpopularity of annuities.
First, we can assess whether, given their subjective expectations, individuals would per-
ceive an annuity as offering at least an actuarially ‘fair’ deal. An annuity rate is defined as
actuarially fair with respect to a given discount rate and set of survival probabilities, if it
14
enables the purchase of a guaranteed income stream until death that has expected discounted
value equal to its price. For each individual for whom we have fitted a subjective survival
curve, we calculate the actuarially fair annuity rate given their subjective survival curve and
given their scaled life table survival curve. The actuarially fair annuity rate for an individual









where r is the interest rate.
Figure 5 compares these ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ annuity rates for our sample assuming
a real interest rate of 0% in both cases. Variation in objective annuity rates comes from
variation in gender, age and year of birth; variation in the subjective annuity rates comes
from the estimated subjective survival curves. 88% of individuals would perceive an annuity
that is priced fairly for the average person of their age, sex and cohort as offering a less than
fair annuity rate.
An individual who perceives an annuity as being unfairly priced may, of course, choose
to annuitize some of their wealth if doing so offers sufficiently large insurance value. To
examine whether survival ‘pessimism’, and the implied divergence between subjective and
life table-based annuity rates, could lead to low rates of annuitization of retirement savings,
we specify a model of consumption, saving and annuitization. We compare results for our
sample in the case where individual survival expectations are consistent with scaled life tables
to those where they are consistent with their subjective survival curve. We account for the
fact that individuals have public pension entitlements, giving them some already annuitized
income. We use data from ELSA on private pension and financial wealth and model the
choice of how much (if any) of this wealth to annuitize at a rate that is actuarially fair given
the individual’s age, sex and cohort.13
13We do not include housing wealth in the measure of wealth which may be annuitized – Appendix B.2
presents a version of our model in which we add a consumption flow coming from owner-occupied housing.
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Figure 5: Comparison of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ based annuity rates
Note: ‘Subjective’ annuity rates are the actuarially fair rate implied by the subjective survival
curve constructed from the individuals responses to the survival expectations questions. ‘Objective’
annuity rates are the actuarially fair rate implied by the scaled ONS life table survival curve for
the individuals sex, age and year of birth. Source: ELSA waves 3–7 and ONS 2014-based cohort
life tables for England and Wales.
4.1 Model
In this section we outline the model of consumption, saving and annuitization. Just-retired
agents (indexed by i) have initial wealth, ai0, and receive public pension income (state
pension/social security), pi, in each period. In period 0, agents choose to annuitize some
fraction of their wealth. In each of the following periods, the agents choose how much of
their resources (the sum of their public pension income, their annuity income and their
un-annuitized wealth) to consume. Borrowing is not allowed.
Individuals make choices consistent with a survival curve – which we can specify to be
either their subjective survival curve (Ssi (α)) or their objective survival curve (S
o
i (α)). When
The differences in annuitization rates between the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ cases in this version of the
model are very similar to those in the baseline model.
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beliefs are consistent with the subjective survival curve, an individual aged z believes that
they have a probability of survival to each age α ≤ 110 that is described by their estimated
Weibull survival curve:








We assume that all individuals believe that they will die at the end of their 110th year at the
latest. Individuals have a constant relative risk aversion utility function and they discount









for x ∈ {s, o} depending on whether they are assumed to have subjective or objective survival
curves. Time is indexed by t, where t = 0 is the year in which we observe a household in the
survey, and z is their age in that year.
At time zero individuals can irreversibly annuitize any fraction their wealth, bi ∈ [0, 1],
at rate θi, which is the actuarially fair annuity rate given S
o
i (α), the objectively-measured









Their annuity income in each future period is therefore defined as anni = θi · bi · ai0. An
individual’s problem is therefore to choose their consumption in each remaining period of















Individuals’ optimal choice of consumption is characterized by the Euler equation which will









≡ Si(z+ t+1)/Si(z+ t). Individuals will be inclined to annuitize more
of their wealth the higher is β (and so the fact that consumption from annuitized wealth
cannot be front-loaded does not imply a substantial welfare cost) and the higher is γ (and
so the longevity insurance provided by annuities is more valued).
We solve the model for each individual in waves 3, 4 and 5 of ELSA who has begun
drawing their public pension, holds positive assets, and for whom we are able to construct a
subjective survival curve.14 We use the first observation for any individuals observed multiple
times, yielding 2,848 observations. Each individual’s initial level of wealth (ai0) is taken as
is the sum of their household private pension wealth and gross financial wealth.15 We take
public pension income (pi) to be that level reported in the data. For each observation, we
solve the model twice. In one case the individual’s expectations are consistent with the scaled
life table survival curve for their sex, year of birth and age, and in the other, expectations
reflect their fitted subjective survival curve estimated from their survey responses.
4.2 Results
We illustrate the impact of subjective survival expectations by comparing the mean rate of
annuitization in the case where individuals behave according to the scaled life table survival
curve for their age, sex and cohort with the case where they behave according to their own




i=1 bi. In Appendix B we show a qualitatively similar result holds when
the outcome of interest is the share of aggregate initial wealth annuitized.
Figure 6 shows the mean rate of annuitization at various parameter combinations of
14In this period, the male public pension age was 65 and the female state pension age increased from age
60 to age 62. The public pension age is the age at which individuals can first claim their state pension. Over
99% of individuals begin to claim at this age. We drop 231 individuals over their public pension age who do
not report deferring their state pension, but yet report a public pension income of zero.
15Pension wealth information is available up until wave 5. Wealth measurements are at the household
level. For individuals in a couple, we therefore take half of this wealth level.
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patience (β) and risk aversion (γ). The real interest rate is set at 0%. Panel (a) shows the
rate of annuitization when individuals have objectively-measured expectations. The annuity
we consider is one which pays a constant (real) income. When households are fully patient
(β = 1), all households will fully annuitize – any risk-averse fully-informed individual will
prefer a constant stream of income to self-insuring against longevity through a risk-free bond.
As patience is decreased, the rate of annuitization falls.16 At a coefficient of relative risk
aversion of 3, the annuitization rate is 69% when the discount factor is set at 0.98, and 51%
with β = 0.96.
For a fixed pair of preferences parameters, variation across individuals in the decision
over how much of their wealth to annuitize is driven by the relative level of public pension
entitlements (pi) and the level of wealth (ai0). Those who annuitize a smaller proportion
of wealth are those who have little liquid wealth relative to the size of their accrued public
pension entitlements. For these households, the value of the small amount of additional
longevity insurance they would receive by annuitizing is less than the additional value of
consuming that wealth sooner.
Panel (b) shows an equivalent set of results for the case when individuals are making
decisions based on their subjective survival expectations. Comparing these rates to those
reported in panel (b), it is clear that subjective expectations have the capacity to substan-
tially reduce annuity demand. For fully patient individuals, the rate of annuitization falls
from 100% to between 42% (log utility) and 64% (coefficient of relative risk aversion of 5).
With modest impatience (β = 0.98), rates of annuitization fall from 47% to 20% assuming
log utility, and from 77% to 52% assuming a high rate of risk aversion (γ = 5).
Appendix B shows that the difference between the proportion of wealth annuitized under
16The annuity puzzle is less stark at lower levels of patience as we assume (realistically) that individuals
cannot negotiate an actuarially-fair annuity with a bespoke payment schedule that fits their patience and
risk aversion. If complete markets for annuities existed, the annuitization rate would be 100%, regardless of
patience. Inkmann et al. (2011) show the that this type of market incompleteness, combined with estimated
risk aversion and patience can rationalize much of the lack of demand for annuities. To see the effects of
our results in a complete markets context, the reader should focus only on the row with β = 1, the level of
patience for which the offered contract is the preferred one.
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‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ expectations is qualitatively insensitive to (1) including a flow
of consumption of housing services for homeowners and (2) using ONS life tables without
“rescaling” and (3) various alternative choices on sample selection and weighting.
Figure 6: Percentage of individuals annuitizing at each parameter combination
(a) Objectively-measured expectations
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.960 19% 31% 40% 46% 51% 54% 57% 59% 62%
0.965 24% 37% 45% 51% 55% 58% 61% 63% 65%
0.970 31% 43% 50% 56% 59% 62% 64% 67% 68%
0.975 38% 49% 56% 61% 64% 67% 69% 71% 72%
0.980 47% 57% 63% 66% 69% 72% 74% 75% 77%
0.985 57% 65% 70% 73% 76% 78% 79% 81% 82%
0.990 68% 74% 78% 81% 83% 84% 86% 86% 87%
0.995 83% 86% 88% 90% 90% 91% 92% 92% 92%
1.000 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Discount 
factor
Coefficient of relative risk aversion
(b) Subjectively-elicted expectations
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.960 8% 15% 21% 26% 31% 34% 37% 40% 42%
0.965 10% 18% 24% 29% 33% 37% 40% 42% 44%
0.970 13% 21% 27% 32% 36% 40% 42% 45% 47%
0.975 16% 24% 30% 35% 39% 42% 45% 47% 49%
0.980 20% 28% 34% 39% 43% 45% 48% 50% 52%
0.985 25% 32% 38% 43% 46% 49% 51% 53% 55%
0.990 30% 37% 43% 47% 50% 52% 54% 56% 58%
0.995 36% 42% 47% 51% 53% 56% 58% 59% 61%
1.000 42% 48% 52% 55% 58% 60% 62% 63% 64%
Discount 
factor
Coefficient of relative risk aversion
Source: Model predictions using ELSA waves 3–5 and ONS 2014-based cohort life tables for England
and Wales. 2,848 observations.
To put the size of the falls in annuitization rates in context, Figure 7 shows the average
rate of annuitization in a model where individuals have objectively-estimated survival expec-
tations but are faced with an annuity rate which, due to adverse selection and other market
imperfections, as well as transactions costs, is offered at 17.5% below the actuarially-fair
rate.17 In panel (b) of Figure 7, we show the model predictions in the case where individuals
act according to their ‘objective’ survival curve, but face an annuity payout equal to 82.5%
of the actuarially fair rate. We reproduce panel (a), where individuals have ‘objective’ ex-
pectations and face the actuarially fair annuity rate, for comparison. This is intended to
illustrate the impact of the degree of actuarial unfairness observed in UK annuities markets
which may be attributable to adverse selection or administrative loading.
17We use 17.5% based on the analysis of annuity rates available on the US market by Mitchell et al. (1999)
who report that “the expected discounted value of annuity payouts per dollar of annuity premium averages
between 80 and 85 cents for an individual chosen at random from the population”.
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Figure 7: Percentage of individuals annuitizing at each parameter combination
(a) Objectively-measured expectations
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.960 19% 31% 40% 46% 51% 54% 57% 59% 62%
0.965 24% 37% 45% 51% 55% 58% 61% 63% 65%
0.970 31% 43% 50% 56% 59% 62% 64% 67% 68%
0.975 38% 49% 56% 61% 64% 67% 69% 71% 72%
0.980 47% 57% 63% 66% 69% 72% 74% 75% 77%
0.985 57% 65% 70% 73% 76% 78% 79% 81% 82%
0.990 68% 74% 78% 81% 83% 84% 86% 86% 87%
0.995 83% 86% 88% 90% 90% 91% 92% 92% 92%
1.000 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Discount 
factor
Coefficient of relative risk aversion
(b) Objectively-measured expectations with 17.5%
rate reduction
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.960 3% 8% 14% 19% 24% 28% 32% 35% 38%
0.965 4% 10% 16% 22% 27% 31% 35% 38% 41%
0.970 5% 12% 19% 25% 30% 34% 38% 42% 44%
0.975 7% 15% 22% 29% 34% 38% 42% 45% 47%
0.980 10% 19% 27% 33% 38% 42% 46% 49% 51%
0.985 13% 23% 31% 38% 43% 47% 50% 53% 55%
0.990 18% 29% 37% 43% 48% 51% 54% 57% 59%
0.995 25% 36% 44% 49% 54% 57% 59% 62% 63%
1.000 34% 45% 51% 56% 60% 63% 65% 67% 69%
Discount 
factor
Coefficient of relative risk aversion
Source: Model predictions using ELSA waves 3–5 and ONS 2014-based cohort life tables for England
and Wales. 2,848 observations.
At all parameter combinations, the actuarially-unfair pricing causes declines in annuitiza-
tion rates comparable to those caused by misperceived survival probabilities. With moderate
levels of impatience and risk aversion, the effects of actuarially-unfair pricing are marginally
greater than the effects of misperceived survival probabilities: at (β, γ) = (0.98, 3), the rate
of annuitization with objectively-measured expectations is 69% but falls to 38% under the
reduced annuity payouts and 43% when individuals make decisions based on their subjective
survival expectations. The effect of subjective survival expectations has a slightly larger
impact than adverse selection at higher levels of risk aversion and higher levels of patience
– at (β, γ) = (1, 5), the average proportion of wealth annuitized is 100% given objective ex-
pectations and actuarial fairness, is 69% given objective expectations and reduced payouts,
and is 64% under subjective expectations and actuarial fairness.18
18The reason for these patterns can be understood by comparing the reasons in each case for annuities
becoming less attractive products. With adverse selection raising annuity prices, all annuity payouts are
discounted relative to the actuarially fair benchmark. With subjective survival rates, the annuity payouts
late in life are not considered valuable – as individuals wrongly perceive that they will likely be dead by
then. When individuals are less patient therefore, reducing annuity payments every period implies a greater
reduction in welfare than does treating payments in the distant future as ‘wasted’. When risk aversion is
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Overall, we take these results as indicating that the effect of individuals misperceiving
their survival probabilities is as large as the effect of adverse selection.
Finally, we note that, as shown by Heimer et al. (2019), individuals at younger ages than
in our sample are likely to also be pessimistic about their later-life survival and consequently
accumulate less retirement wealth under subjective expectations than they would do if their
expectations were unbiased. As the individual annuitization rate is increasing in wealth in
our model, this implies that the effect of subjective expectations on the rate of annuitization
would be shown to be even greater if this savings effect were taken into account.
5 Conclusion
Incorporating individual ‘subjective’ survival curves into a model of annuitization, consump-
tion and saving has the capacity to explain part of the “annuity puzzle”. While market
incompleteness and informational asymmetries play a role in rationalizing low annuity de-
mand, we take our results as showing that misperceptions of survival probabilities are as
important for explaining behavior.
Our results are important for government policy in relation to annuities and retirement
provision more generally. While resources do exist to inform individuals about their life
expectancy,19 the divergence between self-assessed and objective life expectancies and the
associated implications for annuity purchases leave a role for larger policy interventions to
improve households’ understanding of the length of retirement that they might have to fund.
As individuals approach retirement with increasingly large shares of their wealth in non-
annuitized form, ensuring that individuals adequately understand their longevity in this way
will become only more pressing.
high, the welfare cost of the higher price is low relative to the cost of insurance against the modest possibility
of living a long time. This insurance is less valuable as the likelihood of that longevity appears to diminish.
As a result the higher is risk aversion the greater is the effect of subjective survival probabilities relative to
reduced annuity rates.
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A Details of further analysis and tests from Section 2
A.1 Analysis of “50%” answers
The following table details the distribution of individuals by the number of times they
answered “50%” to questions in the expectations module other than the survival questions.
The reporting patterns in the 20.5% of interviews in which individuals answered “50%” to
the first survival question are very similar to distribution of responses amongst the whole
sample.
Table 1: Distribution of number of expectations questions to which individuals answer “50%”
Number of “50%” answers given
0 1 2 3 4 5
All individuals 55.42% 35.34% 8.07% 1.05% 0.12% 0.00%
Answered “50%” to 1st survival Q 52.09% 35.78% 10.20% 1.62% 0.30% 0.01%
Note: Other probability questions include those related to the probability of moving out of ones
home in the future, of being in work in a number of years time, of having insufficient financial
resources to meet needs at some point in the future, of it raining tomorrow and of giving and
receiving an inheritance. Source: ELSA waves 17. 66,210 interviews from 16,345 unique individuals.
A.2 Correlation of subjective reports with risk factors, new infor-
mation, subsequent mortality and holdings of life insurance
Table 2 details the results of a regression of an individual’s answer to the first survival
question they are asked on a range of risk factors as well as a full set of wave by single-year-
of-age dummy interactions. Results are split by gender and by whether or not self-reported
health is controlled for. The coefficients reported are in percentage point deviations. For
example, a male current smoker reports 8.3 percentage points lower chance of survival to
an age 11–15 years ahead of their current age, on average, when compared to current non-
smokers (6.8 percentage points when controlling for self-reported health).
Table 3 reports the results of a fixed effects regression of individuals’ answers to the
survival expectations questions on a range of dummies for whether or not they have received
a new diagnosis of a health condition since their last interview. We control linearly for
age. We find that individuals do respond to new information by revising their survival
expectations. For example, a new diagnosis of cancer or a case of a stroke cause large and
statistically significant downward revisions in survival expectations of 4 and 6 percentage
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points, respectively.
Figure 8 shows the 10 year mortality rates of individuals according to their answer to the
first survival question. We use the linked death records which give us a 10-year horizon for
those interviewed in wave 1 of ELSA. We see clear differences in mortality rates according to
stated expectations. These differences are statistically significant. The correlation between
expected and actual mortality remains even when we control for age and sex-specific average
mortality risk and the range of health factors controlled for in the previous regressions.
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Reported mortality probability (%)
Note: Reported probability of death is 100 minus the reported probability of survival in the first survival
question the individual is asked. Source: ELSA wave 1 and linked death records. 11,502 individuals.
Finally, we examine the correlation of subjective expectations and purchases of life in-
surance, a product that is analogous to selling an annuity. In the ELSA questionnaire,
individuals are asked whether they hold life insurance and the amount that would be paid
out to others in the event of their death. We use this information, along with information
about financial wealth, pension wealth and housing wealth, to generate a variable that puts
the size of the (potential) insurance payout in the context of the net worth of the respondents.
We call this variable the ‘share’ of wealth held as life insurance and define it as:
Sharei ≡
Payouti ×Die10
Payouti ×Die10 + PWi + FWi +HWi
(9)
27
where Payouti is the amount that will be paid out in the event of the individual’s death
and PWi, FWi and HWi are the individual’s pension wealth, financial wealth and housing
wealth, respectively. Die10 is the individual’s ‘objective’ probability of dying within the next
10 years. The idea of multiplying the life insurance payout by this number is to capture the
expected life insurance payout. In the absence of information about the term of individuals’
life insurance products, we assume a term of 10 years.20 In the ELSA sample, 31% of
individuals hold some life insurance and the mean portfolio share is 7% (23% amongst those
who have some life insurance). Life insurance is more prevalent at younger ages.
We use these constructed variables to run a set of OLS regressions where the dependent
variable is the share of wealth held in life insurance and the independent variable is the
subjective report. We control for the the interaction of the respondent’s sex with a full set of
age dummies, dummy variables for whether the respondent has a partner and whether the
respondent has children, and the interaction of their partner’s sex and a full set of dummies
for their partner’s age. We show results with and without controls for the individual’s total
wealth (equal to the sum of their wealth and expected life insurance payout). We focus on
ages where life insurance, which is ordinarily purchased to insure earnings, is most relevant.
We select respondents aged between 50 and 69 (though we get very similar results if we
further restrict to those aged 50 to 59).
Table 4 presents the results. We see that a 1 percentage point increase in the subjective
belief about the probability of survival is associated with a 0.043 percentage points lower
portfolio share held in life insurance (0.036 when controlling for wealth), significant at the
1% level. Columns 3 and 4 show an equivalent set of results but where the sample includes
only those who hold life insurance.
B Robustness of results from Section 4.2
B.1 Robustness of main results to using ONS life tables without
rescaling
We show here results of the model in the case where we use the ONS life table survival
curves without rescaling as our measure of ‘objective’ survival probabilities. Annuity rates
are calculated using the unscaled ONS survival curves. All other details of the model are as
given in Section 4.1. Figure 9 shows the model predictions.
20We obtain very similar results if we instead assume a remaining term of 5 or 15 years and if, instead
of discounting the payout by a probability, we allow it to enter in equation (9) undiscounted. This last
measure would be the share of wealth accounted for by a life insurance payout if the respondent were to die
immediately.
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Figure 9: Percentage of individuals annuitizing at each parameter combination (unscaled
ONS life tables)
(a) Objectively-measured expectations
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.960 28% 40% 48% 54% 58% 61% 63% 65% 67%
0.965 34% 46% 53% 58% 62% 64% 67% 68% 70%
0.970 40% 51% 58% 62% 65% 68% 70% 72% 73%
0.975 48% 57% 63% 67% 70% 72% 74% 76% 77%
0.980 56% 64% 69% 72% 75% 77% 79% 80% 81%
0.985 64% 71% 75% 78% 81% 82% 83% 85% 86%
0.990 74% 80% 83% 85% 86% 88% 88% 89% 90%
0.995 87% 89% 91% 92% 92% 93% 93% 94% 94%
1.000 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Discount 
factor
Coefficient of relative risk aversion
(b) Subjectively-elicited expectations
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.960 20% 30% 36% 41% 45% 48% 51% 53% 55%
0.965 24% 33% 40% 44% 48% 51% 54% 56% 58%
0.970 29% 37% 43% 48% 51% 54% 56% 58% 60%
0.975 33% 42% 47% 51% 55% 57% 59% 61% 63%
0.980 38% 46% 51% 55% 58% 60% 62% 64% 66%
0.985 44% 51% 55% 59% 61% 64% 66% 67% 69%
0.990 50% 56% 60% 63% 65% 67% 69% 70% 71%
0.995 55% 61% 64% 67% 69% 71% 72% 73% 74%
1.000 61% 65% 68% 70% 72% 73% 75% 76% 77%
Discount 
factor
Coefficient of relative risk aversion
Source: Model predictions using ELSA waves 3–5 and ONS 2014-based cohort life tables for England
and Wales. 2,848 observations.
B.2 Definition of model including utility from housing consump-
tion
In Table 5 we show the results from various further robustness checks. We describe one of
these checks in more detail here by defining the model used. We run an alternative version
of the model where homeowners receive utility from the consumption of housing services.
We assume that individuals receive a per-period flow of housing services, h equal to 4% of
the value of their primary house, as reported in the ELSA data. This value is fixed in real









All other details of the model are as given in Section 4.1.
B.3 Further robustness of main results
We here show further robustness of our main results on the average annuitzation rate under
objective expectations, subjective expectations and objective expectations with a 17.5% rate
reduction (i.e. the results in Figures 6 and 7). For brevity, we select one central parameter
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combination, β = 0.98 and γ = 3. We show robustness to various sample selection choices:
(1) removal of individuals who respond “100%” to one or more questions, (2) removal of
individuals who respond “0%” to one or more questions, (3) removal of individuals who
respond “50%” to one or more questions, (4) removal of individuals who respond “0%,
“100%” or “50%” to one or more questions. We show robustness to (5) not weighting our
results using the ELSA sample weights. We show results from (6) an alternative model in
which individuals can choose only whether to annuitize the entirety of their wealth or none
of it rather than being able to annuitize any fraction of their wealth. We show results (7)
weighting the individual annuitization rates by individuals’ initial wealth i.e. showing the
percentage of aggregate wealth that is annuitized. Finally, we show (8) the results from a
model in which there is a utility flow from housing (as described in Section B.2). These
robustness checks are shown in Table 5, with the baseline results from Figure 6 shown in the
first row for comparison.
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Table 2: Relationship between stated survival probabilities and risk factors
Ex. self-reported health Inc. self-reported health
Male Female Male Female
Smoking (relative to non-smoker)
Former occasional smoker -3.1∗ -0.6 -2.8∗ -0.0
Former regular smoker -1.6∗ -0.2 -1.1 0.2
Former smoker, DK frequency -2.8∗ -1.8 -2.2 -1.3
Current smoker -8.3∗∗∗ -7.3∗∗∗ -6.8∗∗∗ -6.1∗∗∗
Alcohol consumption
(relative to once or twice a month)
At least 3-4 days a week -0.1 0.5 -0.9 0.1
Once or twice a week 0.0 0.2 -0.2 -0.1
A few times a year -0.9 -1.1 -0.3 -0.7
Not at all -2.2 -1.4 -1.2 -0.4
Age mother died (relative to 60-64)
Under 50 2.4 1.6 2.5 2.0
50–59 1.2 -2.5 1.0 -2.4
60–64 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
65–69 3.4∗ -1.7 3.3∗ -1.3
70–74 2.2 -0.5 2.1 -0.4
75–79 2.5 0.7 2.1 0.8
80–84 3.6∗ 2.7∗ 3.2∗ 2.9∗
85+ 6.5∗∗∗ 7.4∗∗∗ 6.0∗∗∗ 7.5∗∗∗
Age father died (relative to 60-64)
Under 50 1.6 -0.0 1.9 0.1
50–59 -0.1 0.5 0.3 0.7
60–64 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
65–69 0.7 -1.6 0.7 -1.1
70–74 2.6∗ 1.7 2.6∗ 1.7
75–79 4.3∗∗∗ 3.0∗∗ 4.3∗∗∗ 3.0∗∗
80–84 4.4∗∗∗ 2.5∗ 4.2∗∗∗ 2.5∗
85+ 7.7∗∗∗ 4.6∗∗∗ 7.6∗∗∗ 4.5∗∗∗
Health Conditions
Hypertension -2.2∗∗∗ -2.7∗∗∗ -0.8 -1.6∗∗∗
Heart condition -3.3∗∗∗ -2.7∗∗ -1.7 -1.7∗
Stroke -2.4 -0.3 -0.3 1.5
Cancer -6.5∗∗∗ -3.5∗∗∗ -4.4∗∗∗ -2.2∗∗
Note: Coefficients represent percentage point deviations in mean response. Statistical significance at the
5%/1%/0.1% level is denoted by */**/***. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Other
control variables, for which coefficients are not reported, are whether in a couple, income and wealth quintile,
education level, whether working and dummy variables for whether diagnosed with Alzheimers, angina,
arthritis, diabetes, lung disease, osteoporosis, Parkinsons and psychiatric disorders, whether the individual
is white or non-white and a full set of dummy variables for each single year-of-age and wave interaction.
Source: ELSA waves 17. 43,146 observations of 13,739 unique individuals.
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Table 3: Revision to survival expectations following diagnosis with major health conditions
1st survival question 2nd survival question
Alzheimer’s Disease -4.4 -18.5
Cancer -4.4∗∗∗ -3.2∗
Dementia 3.1 5.4
Heart Attack -3.5∗ -3.1
Lung Disease -1.5 1.0
Parkinson’s Disease -2.5 -6.8∗
Psychiatric problems -2.6∗ -1.3
Stroke -6.5∗∗∗ -5.7∗∗
Observations 48,917 22,926
Note: Coefficients represent percentage point deviations in mean response. Statistical significance at the
5%/1%/0.1% level is denoted by */**/***. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Source:
ELSA waves 37. 48,917 observations of 13,811 unique individuals (22,926 observations of 8,135 unique
individuals for the second question).
Table 4: Association of subjective expectations and life insurance holdings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subjective report -0.0434*** -0.0361*** -0.119*** -0.0984***
(0.00893) (0.00888) (0.0250) (0.0244)
Controls for wealth No Yes No Yes
Has life insurance No No Yes Yes
Observations 14915 14915 5103 5103
Note: Statistical significance at the 10%/5%/1% level is denoted by */**/***. Standard errors are clustered
at the individual level. Source: ELSA waves 35.
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Table 5: Annuitization rates under objectively-measured expectations, subjectively-elicited
expectations and objective expectations with a rate reduction, under alternative sample
selection, weighting and modelling assumptions, with model parameters β = 0.98 and γ = 3
Specification Objective Subjective Objective + rate reduction
Baseline results 69 43 38
No “100%”s 70 45 38
No “0%”s 70 45 39
No “50%”s 70 45 39
No “0%”s, “50%”s or“100%”s 72 51 40
Unweighted 70 44 39
‘Discrete’ annuitization choice 76 44 36
Weighted by initial wealth 90 68 67
Utility flow from housing 54 26 17
Source: Model predictions using ELSA waves 3–5 and ONS 2014-based cohort life tables for England
and Wales. 2,848 observations.
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C Computational Appendix
We solve the model numerically. For each individual i, the model outlined in equation (8)
can be expressed recursively. We outline this below, first focusing on the periods after the
age at which individuals are observed in the data. We denote this age as 0. In these periods
the only decision they face is a consumption and saving choice. We then outline the problem
at age 0 where individuals make an annuitization choice as well as consumption and saving
choice.
C.1 Recursive Form of the Model
C.1.1 Periods after annuitization decision has been made
At all ages t > 0 the model can be expressed in recursive form as:
Vit(ait, anni; pi) = max
cit
u(cit) + βsi(t+ 1)Vit+1(ait+1, anni; pi) (11)
subject to the constraints given in equation (8) which we do not repeat here. Consumption
in period t (cit) is a choice, u(.) is a utility function, V (.) is a value function, and assets (ait)
and annuity income (anni) are state variables. si(t + 1) is the probability of individual i
surviving to period t+ 1 conditional on having survived to period t and could be either that
calculated using life tables or could be that implied by their objective survival curve based
on life tables or their subjective survival curve estimated from individual reports. pi is the
public pension income of individual i.
The fact that the public pension income stream and survival probabilities vary across
individuals means that the value function differs across individuals. This implies that the
value function must be solved for separately for each individual in our data. For notational
convenience we suppress the i subscript for most of the rest of this Appendix.
By assuming that there is an age (T ) beyond which there is a zero probability of survival
(110 in our application) we get sT+1 = 0 and equation (11) for period T reduces to:
VT (aT , ann; p) = max
cT
u(cT ) (12)
and the function VT can be obtained by maximizing the utility function subject to the
budget constraint. Knowledge of VT allows the maximization in the recursion for T − 1 to
be undertaken and for VT−1 to be obtained. This recursive procedure can be repeated for
each period back to (and including) 1 which is the age immediately after the individual is
observed in the data.
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C.1.2 Initial Period
The problem in period 0 differs from that in future periods as agents need to make an
annuitization decision as well as well a consumption decision:
V0(a0; p) = max
c0,b
u(c0) + βs(1)V1(a1, ann; p) (13)
where b, a choice variable, is the share of period 0 wealth annuitized and where the max-
imization is subject to the constraints given in equation (8). With knowledge of V1(.) in
hand from the steps outlined in the previous subsection, the maximization in (13) can be
undertaken. This allows us to obtain policy functions, in particular a function which relates
initial wealth holdings to annuitization decisions for each individual. This is the function
that yields the quantity of initial wealth annuitized for each individual in the data, which
represent our central results. To be clear about what this object depends on we can write the
policy function as b(ai0; pi, si; β, γ) where we making explicit that the proportion annuitized
depends on i) initial wealth ai0, ii) individual circumstances: public pension income (pi) and
the individual’s entire survival curve (si), and iii) the values of β and γ which we vary in
our application.
C.2 Computational Implementation
In the absence of an analytical solution to the agents’ problem, we solve for value functions
in equation (1) and (2) numerically. We take a standard approach, by discretizing the state
variables and solving for the value function at those discrete points. We define a grid of 50
points for assets from 0 to ai0 (initial assets for individual i). Annuity income is placed on a
grid of 10 points which are equally spaced from 0 to θiai0 where θi is the annuity rate faced
by individual i. We restrict the annuity choice to be be on this grid of 10 shares (that is,
individuals can annuitize 0% of their wealth, 100% of their wealth or can choose any of other
8 shares equally spaced between the two extremes). Consumption is a continuous choice,
obtained at each point in the discretized state space using golden section search.21
We have confirmed that our results are not sensitive to the choices we have made over the
manner of discretization and the number of grid points used. As an example, when expressed
to two decimal places, our main result (from Figure 6) for the average share of wealth
annuitized for β = 0.98, γ = 3 is 69.33% under objectively-measured survival expectations
and 42.51% under subjectively-measured survival expectations. When we quintuple each
of the number of asset grid points, annuity income grid points and the grid of annuity
21See, for example, Miranda and Fackler (2002).
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share options to 250, 50 and 50 respectively, the shares would become 70.07% and 42.46%,
respectively.
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